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ARTICLES
The Tuniso-Libyan Continental Shelf Case
by Douglas C. Hodgson*
I. INTRODUCTION
T he 1982 Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Case
Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya)' (Judgment) is only the second continental shelf boundary
dispute to have been settled by judicial means since that Court laid down
the principles of customary international law governing continental shelf
delimitation in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.2 In its opinion,
the Court has traced the historic evolution of the continental shelf con-
cept from the Truman Proclamation of 19451 through the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf,4 the 1969 North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases, and the 1977 Franco-British Arbitration on the Delimita-
tion of the Continental Shelrz (Franco-British Arbitration), up to the
* Faculty of Law, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia. B.A., LL.B., LL.M.
(London).
1 Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18
(Judgment of Feb. 24, 1982). The Court was composed of the following judges: Acting Presi-
dent Elias; Judges Lachs, Morozov, Nagendra Singh, Mosler, Ago, Sette-Camara, EI-Khani,
Schwebel, Forster, Gros and Oda; and Judges ad hoc Jim~nez 'de Arbcha and Evensen.
2 North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Judg-
ment of Feb. 20, 1969).
3 Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945).
' Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.LA.S. No. 5578,
499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter cited as the 1958 Convention].
5 Arbitration Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
the French Republic on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (U.K. v. Fr.), reprinted in
18 LL.M. 397 (1979) (Decision of June 30, 1977) [hereinafter cited as the 1977 Franco-
British Arbitration]. See Bowett, The Arbitration Between the United Kingdom and
France Concerning the Continental Shelf Boundary in the English Channel and South-
Western Approaches, 49 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1978); Colson, The United Kingdom-France
Continental Shelf Arbitration, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 95 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Colson,
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Draft Convention of the Third Law of the Sea Conference,' as well as the
concept's evolution in state practice.7 Since the Court has further devel-
oped some of the principles and rules which it identified fifteen years ago
as relevant to continental shelf delimitation, its recent decision should be
of special interest to jurists and governments concerned with maritime
delimitations of this nature.
The present case is primarily concerned with lateral delimitation of
the continental shelf between the adjacent coastal states of Tunisia and
Libya.8 This paper will discuss the more salient features of the Judgment
as well as provide an analysis of its shortcomings.
II. BACKGROUND
Tunisia and Libya had never succeeded in concluding a formal agree-
ment delimiting any part of the continental shelf situate off their respec-
tive coasts (or any other maritime boundary for that matter). It is appro-
priate at this point to briefly describe the general area of continental shelf
the Court was concerned with in its opinion and, for this purpose, three
maps appearing in it9 have been incorporated within the text of this pa-
per. Both Tunisia and Libya are situate on the northern coast of Africa
and front on the Mediterranean Sea. As can be seen in Map 1, Libya lies
to the east and southeast of Tunisia and the Court was of the view that
the area in which a continental shelf delimitation would have to be ef-
fected is "that lying, very broadly, to the north of the coast on each side
of Ras Ajdir [being the point on the coast at which the land frontier be-
tween the two parties commences], bounded on the west by part of the
Tunisian coast, but unconfined on the east by any visible feature or
agreed delimitation line."10 With respect to seaward limits, neither party
had concluded a delimitation agreement with Malta,"' although Tunisia
U.K.-France Arbitration]; Colson, The United Kingdon-France Continental Shelf Arbitra-
tion: Interpretive Decision of March 1978, 73 Am. J. INT'L L. 112 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Colson, Interpretive Decision].
' Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, Informal Text of Aug. 1980, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF. 62/WP. 10/Rev. 3, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1129 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Draft
Convention].
7 See, e.g., infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
8
,Grisel, The Lateral Boundaries of the Continental Shelf, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 562
(1970); Hodgson, The Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries Between Opposite and Adjacent
States Through the Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf (paper delivered at the Law
of the Sea Institute Annual Meeting, Mexico City, 1979).
8 1982 I.C.J. at 36, 81 and 90.
10 Id. at 35, para. 20.
n A Special Agreement was entered into by Libya and Malta on May 23, 1976 and
entered into force on Mar. 20, 1982. Special Agreement for the Submission to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice of a Continental Shelf Dispute (Libya v. Malta), reprinted in 21
Vol. 16:1
CONTINENTAL SHELF
had concluded such an agreement with Italy in 1971 primarily on a me-
dian-line basis.12 The course of the Italo-Tunisian Delimitation Line af-
fecting the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two states is
reproduced in Map 1.
I J I
Map No. 1
LL.M. 971 (1982) (notified to the I.C.J. on July 26, 1982). Article I requests the L..J. to
decide what principles and rules of international law are applicable to the delimitation of
the areas of the continental shelf which appertain respectively to Libya and Malta, and how
such principles and rules can be applied by the two parties in practice in order that they
may, without difficulty, delimit such areas by agreement. By order of July 27, 1982, the
I.C.J. fixed April 26, 1983, as the time limit for the filing of Memorials by Libya and Malta.
12 1982 I.C.J. at 35, para. 20.
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Notwithstanding the absence of mutually agreed maritime bounda-
ries, both Tunisia and Libya had granted concessions pursuant to domes-
tic legislation for the purposes of exploration and exploitation in respect
of shelf areas regarded by each of them as appertaining to itself. Tunisia
granted its first offshore concession in 196413 while Libya granted its first
such concession in 1968.14 A considerable amount of drilling took place
subsequently which resulted in several productive wells. A concession
granted by Tunisia in 1972 was expressed to be bounded on the southeast
by part of the equidistance line pending an agreement between Tunisia
and Libya defining the limit of their respective jurisdictions over the con-
tinental shelf.15 In 1974, Libya granted a concession the western boundary
of which was constituted by a line drawn from Ras Ajdir where the land
boundary commences at an inclination of approximately 260 to the me-
ridian which corresponded roughly to a perpendicular drawn seawards
from the coast at Ras Ajdir.16 This Libyan concession boundary coincided
with the eastern boundary of a 1966 Tunisian concession.17 However,
since the 260 line lay to the west of the equidistance line, an overlapping
of claims resulted. In the wake of protests in 1976 by Tunisia and Libya
at each other's activities in the disputed area, a Special Agreement was
signed by both states at Tunis on June 10, 1977, which referred the mat-
ter to the International Court of Justice for settlement and established
the scope of the Court's task.18
Pursuant to article 1 of the Special Agreement, the Court's first as-
signed task was to state the "principles and rules of international law
which may be applied for the delimitation of the area of the continental
shelf" appertaining to each of the two parties respectively.19 Article 1 fur-
" Id. at 35, para. 21.
14 Id.
Id.
'e Id. at 37, para. 21.
17 Id. at 71, para. 96.
18 Special Agreement Between the Republic of Tunisia and the Socialist People's Lib-
yan Arab Jamahiriya for the Submission of the Question of the Continental Shelf Between
the Two Countries to the International Court of Justice, June 10, 1977, Tunisia-Libya, re-
printed in 18 I.L.M. 49 (1979) (notified to the I.C.J. on Dec. 1, 1978) [hereinafter cited as
the Special Agreement].
19 Id. at 51. The full text of article 1 of the Special Agreement is as follows:
The Court is requested to render its Judgment in the following matter:
What are the principles and rules of international law which may be applied
for the delimitation of the area of the continental shelf appertaining to the Re-
public of Tunisia and to the area of the continental shelf appertaining to the So-
cialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and, in rendering its decision, to take
account of equitable principles and the relevant circumstances which characterize
the area, as well as the recent trends in the Third Conference on the Law of the
Sea.
Also, the Court is further requested to specify precisely the practical way in
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thermore expressly called upon the Court in rendering its decision to take
account of "equitable principles and the relevant circumstances which
characterize the area, as well as the recent trends in the Third [United
Nations] Conference on the Law of the Sea. '20 Although the first two fac-
tors, "equitable principles" and "relevant circumstances which character-
ize the area," appeared in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases in
which the Court held that international law required delimitation to be
effected "in accordance with equitable principles, and taking account of
all the relevant circumstances,' 2 1 the third factor, "the new accepted
trends" in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
introduced an additional criterion for decision. A further provision in ar-
ticle 1 of the Special Agreement requested the Court to clarify the "prac-
tical way in which the aforesaid principles and rules apply" to the delimi-
tation to enable the experts of both parties to delimit the relevant areas
without any difficulties.2 2 Tunisia and Libya thereby vested in the Court
the right to choose the delimitation method(s) to be applied. In this re-
spect, the Court's assigned task under the Special Agreement would ap-
pear to differ from its role in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases and
the Court of Arbitration's mandate in the 1977 Franco-British Arbitra-
tion. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the parties expressly re-
served to themselves the right to choose the delimitation method(s), call-
ing on the Court only to indicate what principles and rules of
international law were applicable in the light of which the delimitation
method could eventually be chosen.2" In the Franco-British Arbitration,
however, the Court of Arbitration was not asked to declare the legal prin-
ciples relative to the delimitation but to decide the actual course of the
continental shelf boundary and to actually draw the boundary on a
chart.2 4 Pursuant to other articles contained in the Special Agreement,
Tunisia and Libya bound themselves to comply with the Court's Judg-
ment and to put into effect the relevant principles and rules indicated by
the Court through the eventual conclusion of a bilateral treaty.2 5
which the aforesaid principles and rules apply in this particular situation so as to
enable the experts of the two countries to delimit those areas without any
difficulties.
20 Id.
21 1969 I.C.J. at 53, para. 101(c)(1).
22 See Special Agreement, supra note 18, at 51.
23 1969 I.C.J. at 13, para. 2.
214 1977 Franco-British Arbitration, 18 I.L.M. at 408, para. 1.
25 Special Agreement, supra note 18, at 51. Articles 2 and 3 of the Special Agreement
provide:
Article 2
Immediately following the delivery of the judgment by the Court, the two
Parties shall meet to put into effect these principles and rules to determine the
line of delimitation of the area of the continental shelf appertaining to each of the
1984
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III. THE SUBMISSIONS
Having set the stage with a brief discussion of the nature and history
of the dispute and of the Special Agreement, the basic submissions
presented by each party to the Court must be analyzed."' Other submis-
sions not presented under this rubric will appear later in this paper in
their proper context.
Both parties emphasized the importance of natural prolongation in
their respective submissions, but maintained opposing viewpoints in sev-
eral important areas. In its Memorial, Tunisia urged that the delimitation
must not encroach upon the area within which it possessed historic
rights.17 Libya, on the other hand, took the position in its Counter-Me-
morial that the fishing rights claimed by Tunisia as historic rights were in
any event irrelevant to the delimitation.2" Tunisia further maintained
that the delimitation should take account of all the relevant circum-
stances which characterize the area. In particular, Tunisia argued that
their eastern coast is marked by the presence of a body of islands, islets
and low-tide elevations which form a constituent part of the Tunisian lit-
toral (reminiscent of the "skjaergaard" along the coasts of Norway re-
ferred to in the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case29 ). The Tunisian
submissions also focused on the configurations of the coasts of the two
parties, including the irregularities of the Tunisian coast caused by nu-
merous concavities and convexities.3 0 Tunisia relied on physical geogra-
phy to support its contention that the natural prolongation of Tunisia is
oriented west-east while that of Libya is southwest-northeast.31
Libya, however, submitted that the direction of natural prolongation
is determined primarily by the geological relationship of the continental
shelf to the continent, and not by the accidental direction of any part of
the coast.3 2 Moreover, Libya regarded the continental shelf off the coast
two countries, with a view to the conclusion of a treaty in this matter.
Article 3
In the event that the agreement mentioned in Article 2 is not reached within
a period of three months, renewable by mutual agreement, from the date of deliv-
ery of the Court's Judgment, the two Parties shall together go back to the Court
and request such explanations or clarifications as may facilitate the task of the
two delegations, to arrive at the line separating the two areas of the continental
shelf, and the two Parties shall comply with the judgment of the Court and with
its explanations and clarifications.
'6 See 1982 I.C.J. at 26-34, paras. 15 and 16 for a summary of the submissions of the
two parties in the course of both the written and oral proceedings.
2 Id. at 26, para. 15.
28 Id. at 31, para. 15.
29 Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Judgment of Dec. 18, 1951).
-- 1982 I.C.J. at 26, para. 15.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 29, para. 15.
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of North Africa as a prolongation to the north of the African continent
and was therefore of the view that the delimitation method must reflect
such northward prolongation.33 Another noteworthy aspect of the Libyan
Memorial was the Libyan effort to discredit the appropriateness of the
equidistance method in the present case. Libya submitted: (1) that the
parties were not obligated to apply the equidistance method either by
treaty or customary international law; (2) that the equidistance method is
not necessarily equitable since its application under particular circum-
stances may lead to inequitable results; and, (3) that, in the present case,
given the particular geographical configuration, the equidistance method
would result in an inequitable continental shelf delimitation.3,
IV. THE AREA TO BE DELIMITED
To facilitate a better understanding of the Court's reasoning, it will
be useful to briefly set out, with reference to Map 1, a description of the
geography of the area deemed by the Court to be relevant for the pur-
poses of the delimitation.
As can be seen in Map 1, Ras Ajdir marks the point at which the
land frontier between Libya and Tunisia commences on the coast. Follow-
ing the Tuniso-Libyan littoral in a westerly direction, the coast runs gen-
erally in a northwesterly direction for some distance on both sides of Ras
Ajdir. After passing the island of Jerba which forms a convexity of the
Tunisian littoral, one enters the concavity of the Gulf of Gabes which is
followed by a section of coastline running in a northeasterly direction to
Ras Kaboudia. These irregularities characterizing the Tunisian coast, re-
sulting from a series of concavities and convexities and in numerous
changes of direction compared with the regularity of the Libyan coast,
represent a prominent geographical feature of the area under
consideration.
The Court resolved that for the purposes of the delimitation of the
continental shelf between the parties, only a portion of the coast of each
party could be considered relevant. The Court found that Ras Kaboudia,
located on the Tunisian coast, and Ras Tajoura, on the Libyan coast
(both of which are marked on Map 1), represent points on the Tuniso-
Libyan littoral "beyond which the coast in question no longer has a rela-
tionship with the coast of the other Party relevant for submarine delimi-
tation. ' 35 In other words, those sea-bed areas off the coasts beyond those
points cannot be considered to overlap with each other and therefore can-
not be deemed relevant to the delimitation. With regard to determining
' Id.
Id. at 29-30, par. 15.
15 Id. at 61-62, para. 75.
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seaward boundaries of the relevant delimitation area, the Court defined
them solely for the purpose of employing the criterion of proportionality.
The decision is without prejudice to the rights of other states, such as
Malta, which may be asserted in the northeastern part of that area. In the
opinion of the Court, the parallel of latitude passing through Ras
Kaboudia on the Tunisian coast and the meridian of longitude passing
through Ras Tajoura on the Libyan coast together constitute convenient
and appropriate seaward limits of the respective shelf areas to be com-
pared under the proportionality criterion.36
V. THE PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
THE DELIMITATION
Under article 1 of the Special Agreement, the Court's first task was
to indicate the principles and rules of international law applicable for the
delimitation of the area of the continental shelf appertaining to each of
the two parties respectively. 7 The submissions of both parties as well as
the Special Agreement reveal a substantial measure of agreement be-
tween them as to the principles and rules of international law applicable
to a delimitation of a continental shelf appertaining to two adjacent
states when, as is the case here, the states are not parties to the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.38 For both states, the
Court's 1969 Judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases repre-
sents the locus classicus for the applicable principles and rules. Both par-
ties considered that, as in those cases, the present delimitation had to be
effected:
By agreement in accordance with equitable principles, and taking ac-
count of all the relevant circumstances, in such a way as to leave as much
as possible to each Party all those parts of the continental shelf that
constitute a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the
sea, without encroachment on the natural prolongation of the land terri-
tory of the other .... 1
A. The Role of Natural Prolongation
Although the natural prolongation concept was considered control-
ling by both parties, each differed in their argument before the Court as
to how the concept should be applied to the particular circumstances pre-
vailing in the relevant delimitation area. Libya contended that natural
36 Id. at 91, para. 130.
37 Special Agreement, supra note 18, at 51.
" 1958 Convention, supra note 4.
39 1969 I.C.J. at 53, para. 101(c)(1).
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prolongation is determinable as a matter of scientific fact by the applica-
tion of geological criteria and that equitable principles, therefore, are ir-
relevant in identifying appurtenant continental shelf.40 Tunisia countered
by maintaining that the satisfaction of equitable principles in a particular
geographical situation is part of the process of identifying the natural
prolongation.4 1 The Court rejected both arguments, pointing out that
while the natural prolongation concept indeed defined the location of the
shelf rights of the coastal state, the concept was not necessarily sufficient
to determine the precise extent of the rights of one state in an adjacency
situation with another state.4 2 In other words, the appurtenance of a shelf
area to a coastal state is one thing, while the determination of its limits is
quite another. Moreover, it is not possible in all cases to make a precise
determination as to what constitutes each party's natural prolongation.
The Court was of the view that:
It would be a mistake to suppose that it will in all cases, or even in the
majority of them, be possible or appropriate to establish that the natural
prolongation of one State extends, in relation to the natural prolongation
of another State, just so far and no farther, so that the two prolongations
meet along an easily defined line.43
The Court's rejoinder to Tunisia's contention was that the satisfac-
tion of equitable principles is of "cardinal importance" in the delimita-
tion process and that, although identification of natural prolongation
may, in certain geographical circumstances, have an important role to
play in defining an equitable delimitation, the two considerations must
not be placed on a "plane of equality."4 4
B. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
In fulfillment of its duty laid down by article 1 of the Special Agree-
ment to take account of the new accepted trends in the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) in rendering its
decision,'45 the Court addressed itself to the question of whether the prin-
ciples and rules of international law applicable to the delimitation had
been affected by such trends. The Court was primarily concerned with
the concept of natural prolongation. The parties themselves considered
the provisions of the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, particu-
larly articles 76 and 83, as possibly incorporating "new accepted
40 1982 I.C.J. at 29, para. 15.
41 Id. at 44, para. 39.
41 Id. at 47, para. 44.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Special Agreement, supra note 18, at 51.
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trends.' 46 The Court considered that, in so far as the definition of the
continental shelf in the legal context contained in paragraph 1 of article
76 repeats the term "natural prolongation," no new element has been in-
troduced.47 Paragraph 1 of article 76 does provide for a second basis of
the legal title of a coastal state to continental shelf rights-the distance
of 200 nautical miles from the territorial sea baselines in the case of shelf-
poor coastal states4s -which departs from the principle that natural pro-
longation is the exclusive basis of such title. However, the Court reasoned
that since the parties had relied on natural prolongation and had failed to
advance an argument based on the "distance" basis of title, article 76
could not be construed to provide any new delimitation criterion in the
instant case.49 With regard to paragraph 1 of article 83 dealing with shelf
delimitation between opposite or adjacent coastal states, the Court noted
the absence of specific criteria which could guide such states in the striv-
ing for an "equitable solution." 50 The Court's analysis, therefore, dis-
missed the "new accepted trends" in the context of UNCLOS I as a
ground for decision.
C. The Significance of Sea-Bed Features
The Court next considered the geological and physical features of the
sea-bed area deemed relevant for the delimitation, particularly from the
standpoint of their potential effect in determining a division between the
natural prolongations of Tunisia and Libya. Briefly, this sea-bed area was
acknowledged to belong to a broader submarine region referred to by the
parties as the Pelagian Block.5 1 Both parties agreed in the course of the
4" Draft Convention, supra note 6, at 1131. Article 76, paragraph 1 provides:
The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of the
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural pro-
longation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a
distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does
not extend up to that distance.
Id. at 1172. Article 83, paragraph 1 provides:
The delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent
coasts shall be effected by agreement in conformity with international law. Such
an agreement shall be in accordance with equitable principles, employing the me-
dian or equidistance line, where appropriate, and taking account of all circum-
stances prevailing in the area concerned.
Id. at 1174.
47 1982 I.C.J. at 48, para. 48.
48 Draft Convention, supra note 46.
4" 1982 I.C.J. at 48-49, para. 48.
50 For the discussion by the Court of the UNCLOS m trends, see id. at 48-49, paras.
48-50.
51 Id. at 41, para. 32.
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proceedings that the Pelagian Block encompassed land areas in eastern
Tunisia and northern Libya.52 One of the submissions advanced by Libya
emphasized that geology confirmed the northward natural prolongation of
the African landmass under the sea and that the delimitation line must
therefore reflect this northward prolongation. 3 Despite the considerable
evidence adduced by geologists on both sides, however, the Court con-
cluded that it is not possible for legal purposes to delimit the respective
shelf areas of the two parties "by reference solely or mainly to geological
considerations."" As a result, the Libyan contention respecting the geo-
logically determined northward prolongation was not upheld by the
Court.
Tunisia, on the other hand, urged that the natural prolongation of
Tunisia is oriented west-east while that of Libya is southwest-northeast. 5
To support this contention, Tunisia pointed to a number of features as
having possible relevance to the identification of the respective natural
prolongations of the two parties. The Tripolitanian Furrow, a submarine
valley prolonging the Gulf of Gabes in an easterly direction opposite the
Libyan coast,56 was put forward by Tunisia as a possible natural subma-
rine boundary between its shelf area and that of Libya.5 7 In the view of
Tunisia, Libya's natural prolongation extended in a northeasterly direc-
tion only as far as the Furrow.58 Libya sought in argument to minimize
the importance of such features relied on by Tunisia and claimed that the
shelf area within the Pelagian Block is an area of unbroken unity.59 As for
the features relied on by Tunisia, the Court found that the only feature of
consequence was the Tripolitanian Furrow which "does not display any
really marked relief until it has run considerably further to the east than
the area relevant to the delimitation."6 0 None of the features relied on by
Tunisia, then, could be regarded as interrupting the continuity of the sea-
bed of the Pelagian Block as the common natural prolongation of the ter-
ritories of both parties so as to constitute a natural submarine boundary.
In other words, two separate continental shelves or natural prolongations
could not be discerned from the physical structure of the sea-bed of the
Pelagian Block. By virtue of this finding that Libya and Tunisia both
derive continental shelf title from a single, common natural prolongation/
continental shelf constituted by the the Pelagian Block, the determina-
82 Id.
" Id. at 29 and 31, para. 15. See also id. at 52, para. 57.
" Id. at 53, para. 61.
Id. at 26 and 28, para. 15.
"Id. at 41, para. 32.
:7 Id. at 56, para. 64.
6 Id.
"Id.
Id. at 57, para. 66.
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tion of the extent of the shelf areas appertaining to each party would
have to be made by other criteria.
In sum, the principles and rules of international law deemed by the
Court applicable for the delimitation are as follows:
(1) The delimitation is to be effected in accordance with equitable
principles, and taking account of all relevant circumstances;
(2) The area relevant for the delimitation constitutes a single conti-
nental shelf as the natural prolongation of the land territory of both Par-
ties, so that in the present case, no criterion for delimitation of shelf
areas can be derived from the principle of natural prolongation as such;
[and],
(3) In the particular geographical circumstances of the present case,
the physical structure of the continental shelf areas is not such as to de-
termine an equitable line of delimitation."
VI. EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES
In reaching its decision, the Court was bound to consider the ques-
tion of the equitable principles applicable to the delimitation pursuant to
both the Special Agreement (Article 1) and customary international law
as laid down in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.6 2 The Court en-
gaged in an interesting discourse on what it regarded as the role of equi-
table principles. For Tunisia, the phrase "equitable principles" had defi-
nite substance in the sense that in order for a delimitation to be
considered equitable it must respect and "faithfully reflect" the particu-
lar geographical circumstances. 3 As stated in the Tunisian Counter-Me-
morial, "a balance must be established between the various [relevant] cir-
cumstances, in order to arrive at an equitable result, without refashioning
nature. 6 4 Libya countered that a delimitation which respects the physi-
cal facts of natural prolongation could not be considered inequitable; eq-
uitable principles being irrelevant to the identification of appurtenant
continental shelf based on natural prolongation. 5 Nevertheless, the Court
found the concept of natural prolongation to be inapplicable in the pre-
sent case, at least with respect to a lateral continental shelf delimita-
tion. Since natural prolongation could not be a dispositive factor in de-
termining an equitable delimitation line, "equitable principles" would
assume, in the words of the Court, "primordial importance" in the deter-
61 Id. at 92, para. 133(A)(1-3).
1969 I.C.J. at 53, para. 101(c)(1).
e' 1982 I.C.J. at 58, para. 69.
Id. at 27, para. 15.
" Id. at 59, para. 69.
66 See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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mination of such line.17
The Court concurred in the Libyan submission that whether the ap-
plication of a particular delimitation method is in accordance with equita-
ble principles is to be tested by its results:
The result of the application of equitable principles must be equitable.
This terminology, which is generally used, is not entirely satisfactory be-
cause it employs the term equitable to characterize both the result to be
achieved and the means to be applied to reach this result. It is, however,
the result which is predominant; the principles are subordinate to the
goal. The equitableness of a principle must be assessed in the light of its
usefulness for the purpose of arriving at an equitable result .... [T]he
term "equitable principles" cannot be interpreted in the abstract; it re-
fers back to the principles and rules which may be appropriate in order
to achieve an equitable result.68
The Court took pains to distinguish between the application of equi-
table principles and a decision ex acquo et bono, where the Court will
deliver, on consent of both parties, what it regards as a fair and reasona-
ble settlement without being bound by a strict application of legal rules.69
The parties had not bestowed this special jurisdiction upon the Court
pursuant to article 38, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court and, ac-
cordingly, it considered itself bound to apply equitable principles "as part
of international law."70 The Court's decision as to what it regarded as an
equitable delimitation line and its rationale for the decision has arguably
blurred the distinction it sought so carefully to draw.
VII. RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES
Article 1 of the Special Agreement also required the Court to ascer-
tain and weigh "the relevant circumstances which characterize the area"
in reaching its decision.71 Even in the absence of such provision, however,
the Court would have had, proprio motu, to take account of "relevant
circumstances" on the basis of the equitable principle laid down in the
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases requiring all relevant circumstances
to be taken into account.7 2
Although both parties' respective conceptions of the "relevant cir-
cumstances" largely differed, they agreed that the general configuration
of their coasts should be taken into account. Tunisia regarded as relevant
67 1982 C.J. at 60, para. 72.
66 Id. at 59, para. 70.
6 Id. at 60, para. 71.
70 Id.
71 Special Agreement, supra note 18, at 51.
72 1969 I.C.J. at 53, para. 101(c)(1).
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circumstances: (1) the irregularity of the Tunisian coast compared to the
general regularity of the Libyan coast; (2) the presence of islands, islets
and low-tide elevations forming part of the eastern Tunisian coast; and,
(3) certain historic rights.73 For its part, Libya regarded as relevant: (1)
the general configuration of the coasts of both parties; (2) the essential
unity of the relevant shelf area and the existence of petroleum deposits
therein; and, (3) certain domestic legislation enacted by both parties re-
lating to fishing, the territorial sea, and petroleum concessions.7 4
A. Coastal Configuration, the Gulf of Gabes and the Position of the
Kerkennah Islands
The Court concurred in the view of both parties that the coastal con-
figuration must be considered and concluded that the sudden change in
direction of the Tunisian littoral in the Gulf of Gabes constituted one of
the relevant circumstances which characterizes the area.7 5 The Court,
however, rejected the Libyan contention that the Kerkennah Islands situ-
ate off the eastern Tunisian coast (marked on Map 1) should be com-
pletely excluded from consideration on the ground that "the existence
and position of the Kerkennah Islands and surrounding low-tide eleva-
tions ... are material. '7' The Court noted their size (180 square kilome-
ters), their location (approximately eighteen kilometers east of the Tuni-
sian mainland), and the fact that they are separated from the mainland
by relatively shallow waters in reaching its conclusion that they constitute
a circumstance relevant for the delimitation to which "some" effect must
therefore be attributed.7 7
B. The "Three-Line" Coincidence
A third feature of consequence in the Court's view was the position
of the land frontier between Tunisia and Libya which had been defini-
tively established pursuant to a 1910 treaty.7 8 The Court relied upon this
stable land frontier in view of the absence of any formal agreement be-
tween Tunisia and Libya on lateral maritime delimitation, and in view of
Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf which
defined the inner limit of the "continental shelf" in terms of the seaward
limit of the territorial sea.79 Since the lateral delimitation of the continen-
71 1982 I.C.J. at 26-27, para. 15. See also id. at 62, para. 76.
71 Id. at 62-63, paras. 76-77.
75 Id. at 63, para. 78.
11 Id. at 64, para. 79.
77 Id. at 63-64, para. 79.
78 Id. at 65-66, paras. 83-85.
7 1958 Convention, supra note 4. The definition of "continental shelf" provided by
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tal shelf should start, then, from the outer limit of the territorial sea,
absence of a mutually agreed lateral delimitation of the territorial sea
would pose problems which, in the view of the Court, could largely be
circumvented by recognizing the relevance of the land boundary starting
point-Ras Ajdir-as a basic point of reference in determining the delim-
itation line.8 0 In this sense, the Court considered the point of intersection
of the land frontier with the coastline as a relevant circumstance for the
delimitation of the continental shelf between the two parties.
The importance attributed by the Court to Ras Ajdir in this respect
was based partly upon the fact that it was the starting point for a 1913
lateral delimitation line (the mutuality of which is questionable from Tu-
nisia's viewpoint) between Libyan and Tunisian sponge-banks drawn per-
pendicularly to the general direction of the coastline at Ras Ajdir (where
the land boundary commences).8 ' To use the Court's terminology, this
"perpendicular" delimitation line "became a sort of tacit modus vivendi"
or "de facto maritime limit" although it could not reasonably be consid-
ered to constitute a recognized de jure maritime boundary for all pur-
poses between the two parties.8 2 However, considering the complete ab-
sence of formally agreed upon maritime boundaries between the two
parties and the absence of protest by either party to the "perpendicular"
delimitation line over a long period, the Court saw in such line a possible
historical justification for the choice of the delimitation method it ulti-
mately adopted in the area of shelf immediately adjacent to Ras Ajdir.
Moreover, the perpendicular delimitation line corresponded approxi-
mately to another de facto line drawn from Ras Ajdir at an angle of 260
east of north upon which both parties had relied in granting concessions
for the offshore exploration and exploitation of oil and gas. A 1966 Tuni-
sian concession was bounded on the southeast by a stepped line the angle
of which lay on a straight line at a bearing of approximately 26' to the
meridian. 3 In 1968, Libya granted a concession in which the northwest-
ern boundary coincided with the southeastern boundary of the 1966
article 1 is as follows:
For the purpose of these articles, the term "continental shelf" is used as referring
(a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but
outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that
limit, to where the depth of the subjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the
natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar subma-
rine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands.
This definition was considered by the Court to reflect customary law in the North Sea Con-
tinental Shelf Cases. 1969 I.C.J. at 39, para. 63.
80 1982 I.C.J. at 66, pares. 85-86.
81 Id. at 70, para. 93.
82 Id. at 70-71, paras. 93-95.
11 Id. at 71, para. 96.
1984
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
Tunisian concession. 4 The northwestern boundaries of subsequent Lib-
yan concessions followed this same line which, in the view of the Court,
resulted in "the appearance on the map of a de facto line dividing conces-
sion areas which were the subject of active claims, in the sense that explo-
ration activities were authorized by one Party, without interference, or
protests (until 1976), by the other."8"
The Court sought to justify its finding that this 260 line of adjoining
concessions constitutes a "circumstance of great relevance for the delimi-
tation." 6 The Court considered that the 26' line had been "tacitly
respected for a number of years"'87 and implied that the parties them-
selves may be taken to have considered the 260 line equitable.88 The
Court also pointed out that the 260 line was intended by the parties to
delimit the eastward and westward boundaries of petroleum conces-
sions-continental shelf petroleum being the basis of the dispute.8 9 Fur-
thermore, the coincidence of the 26' line of adjoining concessions and the
earlier perpendicular delimitation line noted above (also drawn from Ras
Ajdir at an inclination of approximately 260 east of north for the purpose
of delimiting sponge-banks), and the fact that a continuation of the gen-
eral direction of the land boundary from Ras Ajdir seawards would be
roughly perpendicular to the general direction of the coast at that point,
were considered by the Court as relevant in selecting an equitable delimi-
tation line.90
C. Proportionality
In its pleadings, Tunisia had submitted that the delimitation must
not encroach upon the area off the Tunisian coast within which Tunisia
possesses "well-established historic rights" deriving from long-established
fishing activities of its nationals.9 After some discussion, the Court did
not pass on the validity of Tunisia's historic rights on the ground that the
delimitation method ultimately adopted by the Court "is such that the
delimitation line will undoubtedly leave Tunisia in the full and undis-
turbed exercise of those rights. '92 Nevertheless, the question of Tunisia's
historic rights arose in a related context. Libya and Tunisia agreed on the
need to take into account "the element of a reasonable degree of propor-
84 Id.
85 Id. at 84, para. 117.
88 Id. at 71, para. 96.
87 Id.
Id. at 84, para. 118.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 84-85, para. 119.
81 Id. at 26-27, para. 15.
82 Id. at 77, para. 105.
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tionality . . . between the extent of the continental shelf areas apper-
taining to the coastal State and the length of its coast. '93 They differed,
however, on whether all areas of the sea-bed below low-water mark are to
be compared in assessing proportionality. For the purpose of comparing
areas of continental shelf in the light of the proportionality criterion, Tu-
nisia contended that sea-bed areas lying beneath internal and territorial
waters must be excluded from consideration.94 Tunisia relied on the defi-
nition of continental shelf contained in Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Con-
vention on the Continental Shelf9 I as support for the proposition that the
continental shelf, in a legal context, excluded sea-bed areas under the ter-
ritorial sea and internal waters.' 6
Libya argued that the entire area of sea-bed beyond the low-water
mark of both parties must be taken into account.9 7 Libya's contention in
this respect. was no doubt motivated by its opposition to the system of
straight baselines employed by Tunisia which were drawn to the Kerken-
nah Islands and across the Gulf of Gabes so as to constitute the enclosed
waters as internal waters. Although Tunisia sought to justify the position
of these straight baselines by the historical link between the areas they
enclosed and the Tunisian mainland, Libya refused to recognize straight
baselines for delimitation purposes. The Court rejected Tunisia's argu-
ment for exclusion from consideration of sea-bed areas under internal and
territorial waters in assessing proportionality on the ground that the issue
was not one of definition but rather of proportionality, which is related to
the lengths of the respective coasts of the two parties and not to straight
baselines. In the words of the Court:
[S]ince it is a question of proportionality, the only absolute requirement
of equity is that one should compare like with like. If the shelf areas
below the low-water mark of the relevant coasts of Libya are compared
with those around the relevant coasts of Tunisia, the resultant compari-
son will, in the view of the Court, make it possible to determine the equi-
table character of a line of delimitation.s
Therefore, Libya's contention for a comparison between the more exten-
sive sea-bed areas prevailed.
Tunisia had also advanced the argument in its pleadings that, in ap-
propriate cases, economic factors may be included as relevant circum-
stances in the delimitation process, pointing to its relative poverty in
:3 1969 I.C.J. at 54, parm. 101(D)(3).
1982 I.C.J. at 75, para. 102.
1958 Convention, supra note 79.
1982 I.C.J. at 74, para. 101.
Id. at 71, para. 97.
93 Id. at 76, para. 104.
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terms of natural resources. 99 The Court, however, considered such factors
"virtually extraneous" for the purposes of delimitation, although it did
state that the presence of oil-wells in an area to be delimited may be an
element to be taken into account depending on the circumstances. 10 0 In-
deed, in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the Court stated that
the factors to be taken into account in the course of delimitation negotia-
tions are to include "so far as known or readily ascertainable, the physical
and geological structure, and natural resources, of the continental shelf
areas involved." 110
Therefore, the circumstances considered relevant by the Court in
achieving an equitable delimitation are as follows:
[1] The general configuration of the coasts of the Parties, and in par-
ticular the marked change in direction of the Tunisian coastline between
Ras Ajdir and Ras Kaboudia;
[2] The existence and position of the Kerkennah Islands;
[3] The land frontier between the Parties, and their conduct prior to
1974 in the grant of petroleum concessions, resulting in the employment
of a line seawards from Ras Ajdir at an angle of approximately 260 east
of the meridian, which line corresponds to the line perpendicular to the
coast at the frontier point which had in the past been observed as a de
facto maritime limit;
[4] The element of a reasonable degree of proportionality, which a
delimitation carried out in accordance with equitable principles ought to
bring about between the extent of the continental shelf areas appertain-
ing to the coastal State and the length of the relevant part of its coast,
measured in the general direction of the coastlines, account being taken
for this purpose of the effects, actual or prospective, of any other conti-
nental shelf delimitation between States in the same region.10'
VIII. THE COURSE OF THE BOUNDARY
After having laid down what it considered to be the principles and
rules of international law applicable to the delimitation and taking into
account the relevant circumstances which it had identified, the Court
11 Id. at 77, para. 106.
100 Id. at 77-78, paras. 106-107.
i"' 1969 I.C.J. at 54, para. 101(D)(2). But see the Separate Opinion of President Busta-
mante Y Rivero, id. at 60, para. 5, in which he states that the delimitation of any continen-
tal shelf is not in principle subject to the location of natural resources located therein. See
also Smith, A Geographical Primer to Maritime Boundary-Making, 12 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L
L. 1, 7-8 (1982), where the author provides an example of a marine boundary being drawn in
consideration of the extent and location of resources (the distinct jut in the Danish-German
negotiated line indicating that the two states took into account Denmark's existing oil
fields).
102 1982 I.C.J. at 93, para. 133(B).
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clarified the practical method for the application of these principles and
rules so as to enable the experts of both parties to delimit the areas of
continental shelf appertaining to each state. The Court regarded its task
in this respect as one involving "such a degree of precision that the only
task remaining will be the technical one making possible the drafting of a
treaty incorporating the result of the work of the experts entrusted with
the drawing of the delimitation line."' 0 3 Although the Court acknowl-
edged that the actual drawing of the delimitation line was a function re-
served to the parties for incorporation into a treaty pursuant to Article 2
of the Special Agreement,' 0" it nevertheless considered (arguably exceed-
ing its jurisdiction) that it was not prevented from indicating the course
of the boundary which would result from the application of the practical
methods ultimately prescribed for the parties. The Court reasoned that it
would not be possible for it to take into account as a relevant circum-
stance the proportionality criterion unless it were first able to define the
course of the boundary dividing shelf areas appertaining to each party.0 5
Prior to indicating the delimitation methods deemed equitable in the
circumstances, the Court briefly considered the delimitation methods pro-
posed by each of the parties. Libya's method was based on the direction
of the relevant natural prolongation and it urged that the delimitation
line must be consistent with the northerly direction of the natural prolon-
gation of the African continental landmass. 0 6 Libya conceded, however,
that equity required the taking into account of certain relevant geograph-
ical circumstances, particularly the marked change in the direction of the
Tunisian coastline in the Gulf of Gabes.10 7 This would cause the strictly
northward direction of the Libyan delimitation line to veer to the north-
east to coincide with such a change in the direction of the Tunisian coast-
line. The course of the line resulting from the Libyan method of delimita-
tion can be seen on Map 2. As noted above, 0 8 however, the Court rejected
the basis used for the Libyan delimitation method:
For its part, Tunisia proposed delimitation methods of two types re-
sulting in a series of delimitation lines running in a northeasterly direc-
tion off the Libyan coast (refer to Map 2). The first group of methods
involved defining the natural prolongation of both parties on the basis of
geological, geophysical and bathymetric data which, in the view of the
Court, "do not... add up to 'relevant circumstances' on which a delimi-
103 Id. at 78, para. 108.
10 Id. See supra note 25 for the full text of article 2 of the Special Agreement.
105 Id.
"I0 Id. at 80, para. 111.
107 Id.
103 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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Map No. 2
Limit of territorial waters claimed by each Party.
.... Line resulting from Libyan -method of delimitation.
-........ Sheaf of lines resulting from Tunisian methods of delimitation.
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tation of the kind proposed by Tunisia could be based."'10 9 The second
group of methods involved a geometrical approach based on the configu-
rations of the coasts of the two parties resulting in delimitation lines sim-
ilar to those of the first group. The Tunisian delimitation methods of the
second group were also rejected by the Court. These methods did not give
sufficient weight to other circumstances considered by the Court to be of
greater relevance, 1" 0 such as the 260 line of adjoining petroleum conces-
sions discussed above."'
Having disposed of the delimitation methods proposed by the parties
themselves, the Court set out to propose and justify its own method. To
begin with, the Court did not consider the area relevant to the delimita-
tion to be an area of such "geographical homogeneity" as to justify the
application of only one delimitation method throughout." 2 Indeed, its
predecessor in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases had remarked:
[N]o objection need be felt to the idea of effecting a delimitation of ad-
joining continental shelf areas by the concurrent use of various methods.
• * , [T]he international law of continental shelf delimitation does not
involve any imperative rule and permits resort to various principles or
methods, as may be appropriate, or a combination of them, provided
that, by application of equitable principles, a reasonable result is arrived
at."'3
In the instant case, the Court felt the relevant circumstances necessi-
tated the division of the area under consideration into two sectors of con-
tinental shelf for the purpose of delimitation." 4 The shelf areas close to
the coasts of the two parties would therefore be treated differently from
the shelf areas located further offshore; one delimitation method would
be employed up to a given distance from the coast whereupon a second
delimitation method would be utilized.
A. The First Sector
With respect to the shelf areas closer to the coasts of the two parties
(i.e., the first sector), the Court placed considerable weight on the 26' line
of adjoining petroleum concessions. Since the continental shelf begins, for
legal purposes," 5 at the outer limit of the territorial sea, the delimitation
line's point of commencement must be located on such outer limit. In the
"1 1982 I.C.J. at 80, para. 113.
10 Id.
"I Id. at 83-84, para. 117.
212 Id. at 82, para. 114.
11 1969 I.C.J. at 49, para. 90.
"1 1982 I.C.J. at 82, para. 114.
115 1958 Convention, supra note 79.
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absence of a lateral boundary dividing the territorial seas of the two par-
ties, the point of commencement was considered by the Court to be lo-
cated at the point where the outer limit of the territorial sea of the par-
ties is intersected by a straight line drawn from where the land frontier
commences at Ras Ajdir running at a bearing of approximately 26' east
of north.11 6 Such line corresponds to the northwestern boundary of vari-
ous Libyan petroleum concessions and to the southeastern boundary of
the 1966 Tunisian petroleum concession. 1 From this commencement/in-
tersection point located on the outer limit of the territorial sea, the Court
judged the line of delimitation of continental shelf areas between the par-
ties to run northeast throughout the first sector at the same bearing of
260 east of north until the line intersects the parallel of latitude passing
through the most westerly point of the Tunisian coastline under consider-
ation which is also the most westerly point of the Gulf of Gabes."" The
significance of the most westerly point of the Gulf of Gabes is that it
represents the point at which a radical change takes place in the general
direction of the Tunisian coastline. Indeed, the Court regarded this
change in direction as one of the relevant circumstances to be taken into
account in achieving an equitable delimitation." 9 The effect of this direc-
tional change in coastline would be a corresponding deflection of the 260
line seaward from the point where the line intersects the parallel passing
through the most westerly point of the Gulf of Gabes. The point of inter-
section of this parallel and the 26' line would mark the termination of
the delimitation line's course in the first sector using the first delimitation
method and the commencement of the line's course in the second sector
employing the second delimitation method. The 260 line delimiting the
first sector would give way in the second sector to a delimitation line at a
more easterly bearing to reflect the change in direction of the Tunisian
coastline. 120 The parallel of latitude passing through the most westerly
point of the Gulf of Gabes is illustrated on Map 3. The boundary between
the first and second sectors is marked by a change in the angle of the
delimitation line.
B. The Second Sector
Apart from the general change in the direction of the Tunisian coast-
line in the Gulf of Gabes, another circumstance considered highly rele-
1982 I.C.J. at 85-86, para. 121.
17 See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
8 A summary of the practical method for the application of the principles and rules of
international law applicable to the present delimitation is set out at 1982 I.C.J. at 93-94,
para. 133(c)(1-3).
1:9 Id. at 87, para. 124.
120 Id.
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Map No. 3
For illustrative purposes only, and without prejudice to the role of the
experts in determining the delimitation line with exactness
vant by the Court in the second sector (i.e., the area which extends sea-
wards beyond the parallel of latitude of the most westerly point of the
Gulf of Gabes) is the existence and position of the Kerkennah Islands
previously described. As in the first sector where the delimitation line was
constituted by a straight line drawn at an angle of 260 to the meridian,
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the Court considered that a straight delimitation line, though at a differ-
ent angle, throughout the second sector would also produce an equitable
result.121 The problem that faced the Court, however, was to determine
the angle at which the line in the second sector should be drawn. The
Court found that the general change in direction of the Tunisian coastline
could be expressed in terms of a straight line drawn from the most west-
erly point of the Gulf of Gabes to Ras Kaboudia (see Map 3) whose bear-
ing is approximately 420 to the meridian. 2 2 East of this 420 line, how-
ever, lie the Kerkennah Islands over which Tunisia exercises territorial
sovereignty. The Court determined that a straight line again drawn from
the most westerly point of the Gulf of Gabes along the seaward coast of
the Kerkennah Islands (thereby giving full effect to them) would run at a
bearing of approximately 620 to the meridian. Although the Court re-
garded the Kerkennah Islands in view of their size (180 square kilome-
ters) and position (eighteen kilometers east of the Tunisian mainland) as
a circumstance relevant for the delimitation, it nevertheless considered
that "to cause the delimitation line to veer even as far as to 620, to run
parallel to the [Kerkennah] island coastline, would, in the circumstances
of the case, amount to giving excessive weight to the Kerkennahs."''
The Court thereupon sought to justify this decision by recalling a
number of examples found in state practice of delimitations in which only
partial effect has been given to islands situated close to the coast. The
effect attributed to the Scilly Islands by the Court of Arbitration in the
1977 Franco-British Arbitration'4 is one such example. 25 The Scilly Is-
lands consist of 48 islands lying between 21 and 31 nautical miles from
the southwestern tip of England. Noting that the effect of the Scillies on
the equidistance line was to deflect it considerably more to the southwest
than would be the case if the line were delimited from the English main-
land, the Court of Arbitration decided to give the Scillies only "half-ef-
fect" in determining the equidistance line.'26 This was accomplished by
determining the line midway between an equidistance line giving full ef-
fect to the Scillies and an equidistance line drawn without regard to the
Scillies. 127 Thus, a modified form of equidistance was adopted by the
Court of Arbitration in order to abate the disproportionality which would
result from giving full effect to the Scillies.
121 Id. at 88, para. 127.
122 Id. at 88, para. 128.
123 Id. at 89, para. 128.
124 1977 Franco-British Arbitration, 18 I.L.M. 397 (1979).
125 See Brown, The Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case, 16 SAN DEGo L. REv. 461,
519-20 (1979); Colson, U.K.-France Arbitration, supra note 5, at 110; Colson, Interpretive
Decision, supra note 5, at 114.
126 1977 Franco-British Arbitration, 18 I.L.M. at 454-55, paras. 243-49.
127 Id. at 455-56, paras. 248-54.
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In the present case, the Court attributed "half-effect" to the Kerken-
nah Islands not through the application of a modified form of the equidis-
tance method but rather through the use of the "half-angle" technique.
Such technique involved the drawing of two straight reference lines, one
line giving to the islands in question full effect for the purposes of delimi-
tation and the other completely disregarding the islands.128 The reference
line actually adopted for the delimitation falls between both of these and
bisects the angle which they make with each other.129 On the basis of this
"half-angle" technique adopted by the Court, the delimitation line pass-
ing through the second sector-that is to say, the shelf areas located sea-
ward or north of the parallel of the most westerly point of the Gulf of
Gabes-is a line (at a bearing of 520 east of north) drawn from that point
bisecting the angle formed by a line drawn from the same point to Ras
Kaboudia corresponding to the general direction of the Tunisian coastline
(420) and a line drawn from the most westerly point of the Gulf of Gabes
along the seaward coast of the Kerkennah Islands (running at a bearing
of 620); the bearing of the delimitation line in the second sector parallel
to such bisector being 520 to the meridian (east of north).130 The Court's
approach in this respect is illustrated by Map 3. In the result, the delimi-
tation line in the second sector is deflected to the east (from a bearing of
260 in the first sector to a 520 bearing in the second sector) thereby at-
tributing half-effect to the Kerkennahs. Had these islands been attrib-
uted full effect, the delimitation line would have assumed a 620 bearing
which would have resulted in a substantially larger amount of shelf area
on the Tunisian side of the line.131
Having defined the course of the delimitation line resulting from the
application of the delimitation methods, the Court proceeded to its final
task of testing the equitableness of this line in relation to the criterion of
proportionality. The Court defined seaward boundaries of the area rele-
vant to the delimitation solely for the purpose of employing the propor-
tionality criterion. 32 For this purpose, the Court considered that the par-
allel of latitude passing through Ras Kaboudia on the Tunisian coast and
the meridian of longitude passing through Ras Tajoura on the Libyan
coast represented appropriate seaward boundaries; the entire area of con-
tinental shelf within these seaward boundaries being apportioned be-
tween Tunisia and Libya for proportionality purposes by the delimitation
line selected by the Court. The Court thereupon determined the length of
128 1982 I.C.J. at 89, para. 129.
129 Id.
150 The method employed by the Court in determining the course of the delimitation
line in the second sector is set out at id. at 88-89, para. 128 and id. at 94, par. 133(c)(3).
1 Id. at 89, para. 129.
112 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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the Libyan coast from Ras Tajoura to Ras Ajdir to be approximately 185
kilometers and that of Tunisia from Ras Ajdir to Ras Kaboudia to be
approximately 420 kilometers. Using ratios, the Court ascertained that
the relevant coastline of Libya stands in the proportion of approximately
31:69 to that of Tunisia.13  On the other hand, the Court found that the
areas of continental shelf enclosed by the aforementioned seaward bound-
aries appertaining to each party following the delimitation methods indi-
cated by the Court stand in relation to each other in approximately the
proportion: Libya 40 and Tunisia 60. T" In the Court's estimation, this
result satisfied the test of proportionality thereby confirming the equita-
bleness of the delimitation line it had selected. 135 Considering the extent
of the discrepancy between the two ratios, Tunisia might well hold a dif-
ferent view.
IX. COMMENTARY ON THE JUDGMENT
At least four different aspects of the Judgment raise the following
problems: (1) the Court's reliance upon the 260 line of adjoining petro-
leum concessions in delimiting the first sector; (2) the insufficient weight
attributed to certain relevant geographical features in the delimitation
area; (3) the insufficient regard paid by the Court to the equidistance
method as a possible delimitation method; and, (4) the manner in which
it employed the proportionality criterion.
A. The Utilization of the 260 Line to Delimit the First Sector
The Judgment's primary justification for the delimitation of the first
sector by a straight line at a bearing of 260 east of north is the line of
adjoining petroleum concessions employed at various times by each party.
Such line coincides with the above-noted 1913 lateral delimitation line
between Libyan and Tunisian sponge-banks 36 which was in turn based
on a line drawn on a perpendicular basis in relation to the general direc-
tion of the Tuniso-Libyan coastline at the point where the land boundary
terminates at Ras Ajdir. Although the correspondence of each of these
three lines with each other may have been regarded by the Court as con-
solidating its method on how to delimit the first sector, the 260 line of
adjoining concessions cannot be considered opposable to Tunisia for the
purposes of continental shelf delimitation. A concession granted by Tuni-
sia as recently as 1972 was expressed in 1974 to be bounded on the south-
east by "the maritime boundary between Tunisia and Libya... [specified
1 1982 I.C.J. at 91, para. 131.
134 Id.
'"3 See id. at 91, para. 131 for the proportionality calculations.
131 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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to be part of] the equidistance line.., pending an agreement between
Tunisia and Libya defining the limit of their respective jurisdictions over
the continental shelf. ' 137 The substantial weight attributed by the Court
to the 26' line as a relevant circumstance to be considered in the delimi-
tation of the first sector is all the more incongruous when one considers
the unsuccessful attempts made by both parties to negotiate a mutually
acceptable continental shelf boundary and their eventual recourse to the
Court in this connection. The attempted attribution by the Court of a
consensus ad idem concerning such boundary (where such, it is submit-
ted, never existed) to two coastal states which have never been able to
reach any formal agreement on the lateral delimitation of their respective
maritime zones of jurisdiction, can only impugn the basis on which the
Court proceeded to delimit the first sector.
B. The Effect of Islands on the Delimitation
A second criticism of the Judgment involves the Court's failure to
attribute sufficient weight to the Kerkennah Islands, and its apparent dis-
regard of the island of Jerba lying in the immediate vicinity of the Tuni-
sian coast between the Gulf of Gabes and Ras Ajdir. The Court does in-
deed assert that "the presence of the island of Jerba and of the
Kerkennah Islands... is a circumstance which clearly calls for considera-
tion ... [and] the Court cannot accept the exclusion in principle of the
island of Jerba and the Kerkennah Islands from consideration." 13 How-
ever, in the same paragraph, the Court announces its intention to totally
disregard the island of Jerba '39 essentially on the ground that in the part
of the delimitation area in which Jerba would be relevant (i.e., the first
sector), the existence of the 260 line of adjoining concessions must prevail
over the effect of Jerba's presence. With regard to the relevancy of the
Kerkennahs, however, the Court concludes by affirming that "the exis-
tence and position of the Kerkennah Islands and surrounding low-tide
elevations ... are material. 1 40 Surprisingly, in apparent contradiction of
this latter finding, the Court ultimately decided "that it should go so far
as to attribute to the [Kerkennah] Islands a 'half-effect."' 14
Dealing first with the island of Jerba, Judge ad hoc Evensen pointed
out in his dissenting opinion: (1) that "at low-tide [Jerba] is scarcely an
island, but is separated from the mainland by a very narrow strait"; (2)
that Jerba "has an area of some 690 square kilometers, which corresponds
237 1982 I.C.J. at 35, para. 21.
233 Id. at 63-64, para. 79.
" Id. at 64, par. 79.
140 Id. at 63-64, para. 79
141 Id. at 89, par. 129.
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to twice the size of the island of Malta"; (3) that Jerba's "economic im-
portance ... is significant"; and, (4) that Jerba "has a considerable per-
manent population. ' 142 Perhaps of greater concern, however, is the insuf-
ficient effect attributed by the Court to the Kerkennahs in the drawing of
the delimitation line in the second sector and the consequent loss sus-
tained by Tunisia of a considerable area of continental shelf. It is difficult
to support the Court's decision to accord the Kerkennahs only a "half-
effect" in the delimitation process if one considers: the substantial size of
the Kerkennahs (an area of some 180 square kilometers); their close prox-
imity to the Tunisian mainland (eighteen kilometers therefrom, bearing
in mind that Tunisia claims a territorial sea of twelve miles); the fact that
they are separated from the mainland by shallow waters; the long-estab-
lished fishing activities of the significant population of the Kerkennahs;
and, the fact that an extensive area of low-tide elevations is located off
their seaward coasts.
Apart from these factual considerations, there are legal considera-
tions which support the view that the Kerkennahs should have been
granted full effect by the Court. Under both treaty law and customary
international law, the continental shelf by legal definition includes sea-
bed and subsoil areas adjacent to the coasts of islands. 4 3 This definition
was considered by the Court in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases to
have been regarded in 1958 as a definition "reflecting, or as crystallizing,
received or at least emergent rules of customary international law relative
to the continental shelf.""' Moreover, Article 121(2) of the Draft Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text) carries forward this principle
of identity of treatment for delimitation purposes as between island and
mainland by providing in part that "the continental shelf of an island [is]
determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applica-
ble to other land territory."' 14 5 There can be no doubt that Jerba and the
Kerkennahs fulfill the requirements of an "island" as that term is defined
in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
(Terrtorial Sea Convention) 614 and in the Draft Convention.147 As islands
receive the same rights to a continental shelf as would the mainland
under Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf,148 considerations of demography, economics, history and physical
geography compel the awarding of a full continental shelf to Jerba and
141 Id. at 300, para. 17.
143 1958 Convention, supra note 79.
144 1969 I.C.J. at 39, para. 63.
146 Draft Convention, supra note 6, at 1184.
'40 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, art.
10(1), 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
147 Draft Convention, supra note 6, at 1184 (art. 121(1)).
148 1958 Convention, supra note 79.
Vol. 16:1
CONTINENTAL SHELF
the Kerkennahs respectively. Indeed, state practice supports the view
that islands similar to Jerba and the Kerkennabs (considering their size,
proximity to the mainland, and their being within the territorial sea of
their own mainland) should be awarded a full continental shelf.149 Islands
similarly situated to the Kerkennahs and Jerba have been awarded full
continental shelves of their own under international law. As Judge Schwe-
bel asserted in his Separate Opinion: "There is no rule of international
law which affords islands less than their full effect in the delimitation of
the continental shelf .... "150
In short, it would have been equitable and not without precedent for
the Court to have included Jerba as part of the mainland in delimiting
the continental shelf. There is, in the opinion of Sir Humphrey Waldock,
a "considerable body of state practice" supporting the principle that is-
lands located in the vicinity of the coast may be treated as part of the
mainland on the grounds of geographical association and appurtenance."'
With regard to the Kerkennah Islands and the surrounding low-tide ele-
vations, these types of features were considered relevant by the Court in
its 1951 Judgment in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case.51 There the
Court found that the Norwegian system of straight baselines drawn be-
tween the numerous islands, rocks and low-tide elevations of the "skjaer-
gaard" running along the coast of Norway was not contrary to interna-
tional law.15 3 This holding was subsequently codified by article 4(1) of the
Territorial Sea Convention which provides in part that, "[I]f there is a
fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of
straight baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing
the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured." '5 '
1,9 See, e.g., Agreement on the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Manaar and the Bay
of Bengal and Related Matters, Mar. 23, 1976, India-Sri Lanka, reprinted in BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY STUDY SERIES
A, Limrrs IN THE SEAS [hereinafter cited as LiMrrs IN THE SEAS], No. 77 (Feb. 16, 1978);
Agreement Concerning Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, July 25, 1974, Iran-Oman, 972
U.N.T.S. 265; Agreement on the Boundary in Historic Waters and Related Matters, June
26, 1974, India-Sri Lanka, reprinted in 13 LL.M. 1442 (1974); Treaty Concerning the Delim-
itation of the Continental Shelf Under the North Sea, Jan. 28, 1971, Netherlands-Federal
Republic of Germany, 857 U.N.T.S. 131; Treaty Concerning the Delimitation of the Conti-
nental Shelf in the Baltic Sea, Oct. 29, 1968, Poland-German Democratic Republic, 768
U.N.T.S. 253; Agreement on Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, Jan. 8, 1968, Italy-Yugo-
slavia, reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 547 (1968). See generally D. BowsEr, THE LEGAL REGIME OF
ISLANDS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 176-77 (1979).
150 1982 I.C.J. at 99.
11 Waldock, The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 114, 142
(1951).
,12 Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Judgment of Dec. 18, 1951).
153 Id. at 130.
154 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 146, art.
1984
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
Not only do the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case and article 4(1) of
the Territorial Sea Convention support Tunisia's position of advocating
the drawing of straight baselines to the Kerkennahs, they also add sup-
port to the view that at least the seaward coasts of the Kerkennahs
should have been employed as base points for the continental shelf delim-
itation line. In other words, the Kerkennahs should have been given full
effect. In the words of Judge Schwebel: "[T]he Court has not carried the
burden of demonstrating why granting full effect to the Kerkennahs
would result in giving them 'excessive weight.' "15 At the relevant point
in the second sector, the Kerkennahs should have been relied on in deter-
mining the delimitation line and, accordingly, the delimitation line should
have run at a bearing of 620 east of north-based on the attribution of
full effect to the Kerkennahs-rather than at the "half-angle" of 520 cho-
sen by the Court. The ignoring of the island of Jerba by the Court in
delimiting the first sector and giving only a half-effect to the Kerkennahs
in delimiting the second sector was an unwarranted refashioning of the
geography of the Tunisian coastline, the equity of which is surely
questionable.
C. The Role of Equidistance
The third area in which the Judgment warrants criticism is the insuf-
ficient attention paid by the Court to equidistance as a possible delimita-
tion method. The Court merely formulated some general observations on
the equidistance method 156 without providing sufficient reasons why it
chose not to employ this method, which has been codified by article 6(2)
of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. 51 One writer
has carefully considered the "travaux pr~paratoires" of article 6 in order
to determine the proper role to be assigned to the equldistance principle
as incorporated within article 6(2). Professor E. D. Brown concluded that,
"[T]he travaux pr~paratoires provide strong evidence that the intention
of the parties to the [1958] Geneva Convention [on the Continental Shelf]
was that the equidistance principle of Article 6 should be regarded as 'the
general rule' or 'the major principle'... [and that] there is a presumption
1 1982 I.C.J. at 99.
" Id. at 78-79, paras. 109-10, and at 88, para. 126.
1958 Convention, supra note 4. Article 6(2) provides:
Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent
States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement
between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is
justified by special circumstances, the boundary line shall be determined by appli-
cation of the principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.
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in favour of the rule."15 In a recent article, Robert W. Smith points out
that, although various methods have been used to delimit maritime
boundaries as evidenced by state practice, "[T]he equidistant line has
been found to be acceptable in many negotiations; in some situations a
multi-segmented equidistant line has been simplified; in other cases mod-
ifications have been made to the method used to calculate an equidistant
line. ' 159 State practice has generally been consistent with article 6(2).260
In short, the prevalent use of equidistance as a method of continental
shelf delimitation between adjacent states and its apparent convenience
in resolving delimitation disputes may have raised its status above that
accorded it by the majority of the Court.
The starting point of the majority was the holding in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases that the equidistance method of delimitation is
not a mandatory rule of customary law.161 The Court observed that the
practice of states subsequent to 1969, as is apparent from treaties delimit-
ing the continental shelf, shows that states have employed methods other
than equidistance in order to attain an equitable solution. Furthermore,
in the Court's view, the equidistance method does not have "privileged
status" in relation to other methods in the sense that the Court did not
consider that it was "required, as a first step, to examine the effects of a
delimitation by application of the equidistance method, and to reject that
method in favour of some other only if it considers the results of an equi-
distance line to be inequitable."162 However, though the Court ultimately
rejected the equidistance method in the present case, 6" it did consider its
153 Brown, supra note 126, at 505.
'89 Smith, supra note 101, at 10.
1,0 See, e.g., Convention on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Bay of
Biscay, Jan. 29, 1974, France-Spain, reprinted in LamTs IN THE SEAS, supra note 149, No. 83
(Feb. 12, 1979); Treaty Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Under the
North Sea, Jan. 28, 1971, Netherlands-Federal Republic of Germany, 857 U.N.T.S. 131;
Treaty Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Under the North Sea, Jan. 28,
1971, Denmark-Federal Rebublic of Germany, 857 U.N.T.S. 109; Agreement Relating to the
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Boundaries in the Northern Part of the Straits of
Malacca, Dec. 21, 1971, Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand, reprinted in Limrrs iN THE SEAS,
supra note 149, No. 81 (Dec. 27, 1978); Treaty Concerning the Boundary of the Continental
Shelf in the Gulf of Gdansk and the South-Eastern Part of the Baltic Sea, Aug. 28, 1969,
Poland-U.S.S.R., 769 U.N.T.S. 75; Treaty Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental
Shelf in the Baltic Sea, Oct. 29, 1968, Poland-German Democratic Republic, 768 U.N.T.S.
253; Agreement Relating to the Division of the Continental Shelf in the Varangerflord, Feb.
15, 1957, Norway-U.S.S.R., reprinted in LIMITs IN THE SEAS, supra note 149, No. 17.
161 969 I.C.J. at 46, para. 83. The Court also stated that, for the purpose of applying
equitable principles: "[T]he equidistance method can be used, but other methods exist and
may be employed, alone or in combination, according to the areas involved." Id. at 47, para.
85.
162 1982 I.C.J. at 79, para. 110.
10 Id. at 62-63, para. 126.
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possible relevance to the delimitation in the second sector:
[I]t should be recognized that it is the virtue-though it may also be the
weakness-of the equidistance method to take full account of almost all
variations in the relevant coastlines. Furthermore, the Court in its 1969
Judgment recognized that there was much less difficulty entailed in a
general application of the equidistance method in the case of coasts op-
posite to one another, when the equidistance line becomes a median line,
than in the case of adjacent States (I.C.J. Reports 1969, pp. 36-37, para.
57). The major change in direction undergone by the coast of Tunisia
seems to the Court to go some way, though not the whole way, towards
transforming the relationship of Libya and Tunisia from that of adjacent
States to that of opposite States, and thus to produce a situation in
which the position of an equidistance line becomes a factor to be given
more weight in the balancing of equitable considerations than would oth-
erwise be the case.""
Notwithstanding this momentary inclination towards equidistance,
the Court never really did examine the effect on an equidistance line of
the more outstanding geographical features and whether any inequitable
results that might be produced by the employment of the equidistance
principle could be abated by modifications to the application of such
method. The Court's finding that the equidistance method is not applica-
ble loses its persuasiveness since the grounds for excluding equidistance
were not adequately canvassed. In this respect, Judge ad hoc Evensen
maintained the view that, "[T]he equidistance principle would, in the
present case-adjusted or tempered by considerations of equity-have
given a more equitable and a more verifiable solution than the line given
by the Court... [which] should at least have endeavoured to give a de-
tailed analysis of an equidistance line adjusted by equity considerations,
and why such a line would lead to inequitable results."'15 Although it may
well be that the Court was not required (as it has opined) to examine the
effects of a delimitation by application of the equidistance method as a
first step, it should nevertheless have considered itself required to do so
at some point in its Judgment, especially in view of its predecessor's
statement in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases to the effect that
the concurrent use of various methods is not objectionable provided that
it leads to a reasonable result.16 6 The Court, therefore, should have ex-
amined several methods including equidistance in order to compare their
respective effects. In the words of Judge Gros (dissenting), the "lack of a
systematic search for the equitable has produced a result the equity of
184 Id. at 88, para. 126.
165 Id. at 319.
l 1969 I.C.J. at 50, para. 90.
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which remains to be proved. '167
D. Proportionality
The Court included in its enumeration of the relevant circumstances
to be taken into account in achieving an equitable delimitation:
[T]he element of a reasonable degree of proportionality, which a delimi-
tation carried out in accordance with equitable principles ought to bring
about between the extent of the continental shelf areas appertaining to
the coastal State and the length of the relevant part of its coast, mea-
sured in the general direction of the coastlines, account being taken for
this purpose of the effects, actual or prospective, of any other continental
shelf delimitation between States in the same region. 168
This language concerning proportionality appeared in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases Judgment 69 which perceived the role of propor-
tionality to be that of establishing "the necessary balance between States
with straight and those with markedly concave or convex coasts or to re-
duce very irregular coastlines to their truer proportions.' ' 70 In the instant
case, Judge ad hoc Jim6nez de Archaga succinctly pointed out in his
Separate Opinion the proper role of proportionality as a factor intended
to verify the equitableness of the line of delimitation selected:
[The function of proportionality] is to test the equitable character of the
method of delimitation used, in the light of the results to which it leads.
It constitutes a test to be applied ex post facto to the results obtained
through the appreciation of the relevant circumstances, and not a rele-
vant circumstance or independent factor in itself.17'
In other words, proportionality is never to be used to directly deter-
mine the course of the actual delimitation line but rather to provide a
basis for considering whether a particular delimitation line already se-
lected is equitable or otherwise. In this regard, the Court of Arbitration in
the 1977 Franco-British Arbitration formulated the following views on
the role of proportionality in a continental shelf delimitation:
[T]he equitable delimitation of the continental shelf is not.., a question
of apportioning-sharing out-the continental shelf amongst the States
abutting upon it. Nor is it a question of simply assigning to them areas of
the shelf in proportion to the length of their coastlines; for to do this
would be to substitute for the delimitation of boundaries a distributive
187 1982 I.C.J. at 149, para. 11.
1" Id. at 93, para. 133(B)(5).
169 1969 LC.J. at 52, para. 98 and at 54, para. 101(D)(3).
170 Id. at 52, para. 98.
7 1982 I.C.J. at 138, para. 117.
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apportionment of shares . . . . Proportionality, therefore, is to be used
as a criterion or factor relevant in evaluating the equities of certain geo-
graphical situations, not as a general principle providing an indepen-
dent source of rights to areas of continental shelf.17 2
Proportionality, then, can be considered a relevant factor in evaluat-
ing whether the final result is equitable, but it cannot be regarded as an
independent source of rights to areas of continental shelf. Put in another
way, the proportionality criterion cannot influence in any way the deter-
mination of where the continental shelf boundary should run otherwise
than on an ex post facto basis. It is submitted that the majority of the
Court should have elaborated upon the limitations attached to the use of
proportionality.
Other aspects concerning the manner in which the Court utilized the
proportionality criterion are more troubling. The 1969 Court referred to
"the element of a reasonable degree of proportionality"'1 3 and it would
seem that the Court in the instant case has overconceptualized the pro-
portionality criterion by attempting to arrive at mathematically precise
calculations in the form of ratios. 7 4 The 1977 Court of Arbitration shied
away from what it described as "nice calculations" of proportionality1 7 5
and, indeed, in the present case the Court does not provide many details
on how the figures contained in the ratios have been determined. In any
event, attempts at mathematical refinement of the proportionality con-
cept are bound to create difficulties since in most cases the extent of the
continental shelf areas concerned and the length of the relevant coasts
will not be susceptible to precise calculation. For example, the Court at-
tempted to establish seaward boundaries in the form of a parallel of lati-
tude and meridian of longitude for the purpose of defining in advance the
area of continental shelf within which the delimitation line would be
drawn.1 76 Such an approach is not very realistic since it ignores the possi-
bility that in many cases, such as the present one, the seaward boundaries
of the area relevant to the delimitation (and, hence, the extent of the
continental shelf areas concerned) will not be able to be defined with cer-
tainty until the rights of third states in this area have been the subject of
formal agreement by the states concerned. Although neither party has
concluded a continental shelf delimitation agreement with Malta,1 77 the
Court considered that "the parallel of latitude passing through Ras
Kaboudia, and the meridian of longitude passing through Ras Tajoura,
172 1977 Franco-British Arbitration, 18 I.L.M. at 427, para. 101 (emphasis added).
173 1969 I.C.J. at 52, para. 98 (emphasis added).
274 1982 I.C.J. at 91, para. 131.
175 1977 Franco-British Arbitration, 18 I.L.M. at 412, para. 27.
178 1982 I.C.J. at 61-62, para. 75 and at 91, para. 130.
177 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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which have the advantage of cartographical convenience" constitute ap-
propriate seaward boundaries of the area relevant for the delimitation.'78
Consider the Court's previous statement:
The conclusion that these areas [i.e., the areas of continental shelf not
enclosed within the relevant delimitation area by the seaward boundaries
formed by the parallel and meridian in question] are not legally relevant
to the delimitation between the parties does not however lead to the con-
clusion by way of corollary that the whole area bounded by the [relevant]
coasts of both countries and by such seaward boundaries is reserved in
its entirety for division between Libya and Tunisia. 179
In view of this statement, the Court's drawing of such seaward boundaries
for the purpose of employing the proportionality criterion was neither
practical nor conducive to precise mathematical calculation in view of the
possibility, acknowledged by the Court itself, of certain continental shelf
rights within the bounded area belonging ab initio to a third state such as
Malta.
Finally, with regard to proportionality, the Court's statement that it
"is not convinced by the Tunisian contention that the areas of internal
and territorial waters must be excluded from consideration" 80 in apply-
ing the proportionality test cannot pass without comment. Although the
Court reaffirmed that in a legal context the continental shelf does not
include sea-bed areas below territorial and internal waters, 81 it neverthe-
less based its proportionality calculations on such areas as well as areas of
shelf beyond the territorial sea of each party. 8 2 Such an approach is
surely at odds with the definition of the continental shelf for legal pur-
poses. Provided the straight baselines employed by Tunisia are justified
by the circumstances, and it is submitted that they are,'"" there should
have been no further obstacles in excluding sea-bed areas below internal
and territorial waters from consideration in assessing proportionality. It is
probable, however, that difficulties encountered by some members of the
Court in accepting the validity of the straight Tunisian baselines drawn
to the Kerkennah Islands had considerable bearing on the Court's deci-
sion to include such areas within the areas considered relevant for the
proportionality test.
178 1982 I.C.J. at 91, par. 130.
179 Id. at 62, para. 75.
180 Id. at 76, para. 104.
181 Id.
ll Id. at 91, para. 131.
18 See supra section IX(B) of text.
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X. THE IMPORT OF THE JUDGMENT
It is a trite statement that the area found to appertain to each
coastal state concerned in the delimitation of a continental shelf does not
necessarily have to be equal to be equitable; yet underlying the Judgment
seems to be the desire of the Court to reach a solution which places Tuni-
sia and Libya in a position of equality. Such an approach was clearly pro-
scribed by the Court in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases when it
remarked, "Equity does not necessarily imply equality. There can never
be any question of completely refashioning nature ... "I The Court,
then, must accept the natural inequalities of the coastline and other rele-
vant geographical features as it finds them. The Court of Arbitration in
the Franco-British Arbitration similarly recognized that "[T]here can
never be a question of completely refashioning nature, such as by render-
ing the situation of a State with an extensive coastline similar to that of a
State with a restricted coastline." 185 In seeking equality when Tunisia and
Libya are not on an equal geographical footing by attributing insufficient
weight to a number of relevant geographical features, the Court failed to
strike an equitable solution for both of them-it being necessary that a
delimitation be equitable for both parties.
The Court was requested by the parties to decide the matter of the
continental shelf delimitation submitted to it in accordance with interna-
tional law which requires the application of equitable principles. Equity,
however, was never intended to remedy natural inequalities by refash-
ioning the geography of coastlines, and it is in this respect that the Court
in the present case has applied equitable principles in a manner which is
at odds with the approach of the 1969 Court. Although the Court care-
fully pointed out that it was bound in reaching its decision to apply equi-
table principles as part of international law as opposed to adjudicating ex
aequo et bono, 88 the distinction between equitable principles infra legem
and considerations ex aequo et bono has unfortunately been blurred by
its pronouncements.
In light of the compelling dissenting opinions expressed in the Judg-
ment, it is difficult to predict with certainty the Judgment's impact on
future shelf delimitations, such as that pending before a specially consti-
tuted chamber of the Court between Canada and the United States con-
cerning the Gulf of Maine dispute. Certainly, one might expect in the
short-term at least that the Judgment will discourage states from submit-
ting their shelf disputes to the International Court of Justice for settle-
ment for fear that they will find themselves bound to a "discretionary"
1 1969 I.C.J. at 49, para. 91; see also id. at 48, para. 88.
:85 1977 Franco-British Arbitration, 18 LL.M. at 427, para. 101.
86 1982 I.C.J. at 60, para. 71.
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decision. For those coastal states that do submit to the jurisdiction of the
Court, one might reasonably expect them to attempt to distinguish the
instant decision on the basis of the arguably narrow grounds upon which
it was decided.

